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ABSTRACT
This paper explores the relationship between household marginal income tax rates, the set of assets
that households own, and the portfolio shares accounted for by each of these assets.  It analyzes data from
the 1983, 1989, 1992, and 1995 Surveys of Consumer Finances and develops a new algorithm for
imputing federal marginal tax rates to households in these surveys.  The empirical findings suggest that a
household’s marginal tax rate has an important effect its asset allocation decisions.  The probability that a
household owns tax-advantaged assets is strongly related to its tax rate on ordinary income.  In addition,
the amount of investment through tax-deferred accounts such as 401(k) plans and IRAs is an increasing
function of the household’s marginal tax rate.  Holdings of corporate stock, which is taxed less heavily than
interest bearing assets, and of tax-exempt bonds are also increasing in the household’s marginal tax rate.
Holdings of heavily taxed assets, such as corporate bonds and interest-bearing accounts, decline as a share
of wealth as a household’s marginal tax rate increases.
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poterba@mit.edu                      The federal income tax places different tax burdens on different types of capital income.   Interest
and dividends are included in ordinary income, while capital gains are taxed at a preferential rate, and then
only upon realization.  Interest on state and local government bonds is tax-exempt.  Different individuals
also face different federal marginal income tax rates, ranging in the late 1990s from 0 to just over 40
percent. The range was even larger prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1986.   Taxation generates potentially
significant differences between the pre-tax and the post-tax returns available to individual investors. It also
creates variation in the relative tax burdens on different assets facing different investors.
There have been relatively few empirical studies of how taxation affects portfolio allocation,
although a substantial body of research has considered the theory of household portfolio choice in the
presence of differential taxation.  The lack of research on portfolio structure is due in part to the relative
scarcity of reliable information on the asset holdings of the high-wealth households who hold a significant
share of financial assets.  Since 1983, however, the Federal Reserve Board has sponsored a triennial Survey
of Consumer Finances that provides high-quality information on asset holdings.  This survey includes a
substantial number of high net worth households.  In this paper, we exploit these data to explore how taxes
affect portfolio choice.
We classify all financial assets into one of eight categories and examine the effect of taxes on both
the decision to own assets in each category and the decision of how much of the portfolio to allocate to each
asset. We follow two empirical strategies.  The first focuses on the cross-sectional relationship between
marginal tax rates and portfolio structure in each of the Surveys of Consumer Finances.  Theoretical models
of differential taxation and portfolio structure yield their clearest predictions with respect to such cross-
sectional patterns.  Unfortunately, because marginal tax rates are a function of a household’s taxable
income, which in turn is a function of its labor income and its income from assets, it can be difficult to
disentangle income effects from tax rate effects in the cross-section. 
For this reason, we also develop a second empirical approach that uses the repeated cross-
sections of the Survey of Consumer Finances.  While the theoretical basis for interpreting how systematic2
changes in the structure of marginal tax rates affect household portfolio structure is less solid than that
for analyzing cross-sectional patterns, the source of the identifying variation in tax rates is much clearer. 
Using repeated cross sections also provides us with a much larger data set than any one cross-section, and
it offers more variation in marginal tax rates than any single cross-section.
This paper is divided into seven sections.  The first summarizes existing models of portfolio choice
in the presence of differential capital income taxation.  It provides the conceptual basis for our subsequent
empirical work.  This section includes a discussion of the tax treatment of assets held in tax-deferred
accounts, such as Individual Retirement Accounts and 401(k) plans.  These accounts break the traditional
link between a financial asset’s characteristics, such as a bank deposit, a corporate bond, or an equity mutual
fund, and its tax treatment.  Section two summarizes previous empirical work on how taxes affect portfolio
composition, and places our empirical strategy in context.
Section three describes the Survey of Consumer Finances data that we analyze, explains our
procedure for imputing marginal tax rates to households in the survey, and presents some information on the
changing pattern of marginal income tax rates over our sample years.  The fourth section outlines our
econometric framework for analyzing which assets households own and the portfolio shares allocated to
each of these assets.  Section five presents our empirical findings on the discrete decisions households make
about whether to hold particular asset categories.  Section six presents parallel results on the amounts that
households choose to invest in different asset categories.  In each of these sections, we present findings from
both the 1995 SCF cross-section and the repeated cross-sections database.  We also develop illustrative
results that describe how changes in marginal tax rates might affect the structure of household portfolios.
There is a brief conclusion.
1.  Portfolio Choice with Differential Taxation
If all assets are riskless, and if different investors face different marginal tax rates on different
assets, then investors should segregate into asset clienteles.  Miller (1977) builds on this simple but3
powerful point in his model of corporate leverage decisions.  He assumes that there are only two portfolio
assets, corporate debt and corporate equity.  He further assumes that investors are not taxed on the income
of corporate equities, but that they are taxed on interest payments from corporate bonds.  In this setting,
investors facing high tax rates should specialize in equity, while investors in lower tax brackets should hold
only corporate debt.  In Miller’s (1977) equilibrium, the supply of debt and equity adjusts so that those
households with marginal tax rates above (below) the corporate rate hold only equity (debt).
The basic insight of clientele formation generalizes to the many-asset case, provided all assets have
the same risk characteristics.  The highest tax bracket investors should hold only the most tax-advantaged
assets and the lowest tax bracket investors should hold only the least tax-advantaged assets.
The insight of clientele formation still influences portfolio choice in the presence of uncertain
returns, but under plausible assumptions, strict clienteles no longer arise.  Auerbach and King (1983),
Brennan (1970), and McDonald (1983) are the theoretical studies that provide the most direct analysis of
equilibrium portfolio choice in the presence of differential taxation.  Auerbach and King (1983) show that if
investors can obtain all possible pre-tax return streams from assets with their own most-preferred tax
treatment, then strict portfolio clienteles will emerge.  The condition that leads to this result is very strong. 
Consider what it requires there are two classes of securities, stocks and bonds, which are taxed differently. 
It must be possible for an investor who prefers bonds to be able to obtain any pre-tax return stream that is
available on an equity security from a portfolio of bonds as well.  This condition seems unlikely to be
satisfied in practice, even with more than two asset categories.
If investors cannot span the set of pre-tax returns with assets from the asset class that they prefer for
tax reasons, then they will hold portfolios determined by both their tax preferences and their risk
preferences.   The simplest case to consider is that of the capital asset pricing model (CAPM).   Equilibrium
portfolio allocations in the CAPM without taxes are such that every investor holds a combination of the
market portfolio and the riskfree asset.  Every investor owns every asset, and all investors hold the same
share of their risky asset portfolio in each risky asset.  When the CAPM framework is expanded to allow for4
differential taxation of ordinary income and capital gains, and to allow for investor heterogeneity in tax
rates, as in Auerbach and King (1983), investors hold a combination of two portfolios of risky assets.  One
is the market portfolio, which still represents the most efficient means of diversifying risk, and the other is a
portfolio of assets on which the investor is lightly taxed compared to other investors.  That is, investors who
face high tax rates deviate from the market portfolio toward lightly taxed assets, and those with low tax rates
deviate into more heavily taxed assets.
While our empirical work does not develop tests of the structural equations generated by the after-
tax CAPM, the predictions of this model motivate our empirical work.  We investigate whether households’
deviations from the average portfolio are systematically related to their marginal tax rates. 
The foregoing discussion assumes that specific assets have immutable tax and return characteristics.
 Bonds, for example, generate highly taxed income, and offer less risky returns than corporate equities. 
Recent institutional changes in the tax environment confronting savers in the United States and many other
nations has eroded the plausibility of this assumption.  The rise of tax-deferred retirement saving accounts
has expanded the set of investment options available to most investors.   Many households can now choose
not only whether to hold a particular asset, but also whether to hold such an asset in their taxable account or
in a tax-deferred account.  Because investments in tax-deferred accounts are taxed differently than the same
investments would be if they were not held in these accounts, this results in an expanded set of individual
investment options.
The two most popular tax-deferred saving vehicles in the United States are Individual Retirement
Accounts and 401(k) plans.   Poterba, Venti, and Wise (1998) explain that both became widely available
beginning in the early 1980s.   Both types of accounts allow investors to defer taxes on accruing capital
income until the account balances are drawn down, typically in retirement.  Withdrawals from these
accounts are taxed as ordinary income, and are subject to an additional 10 percent penalty tax if they are
made before age 59 1/2.  401(k) plans frequently offer an additional rate-of-return enhancement: employers
may match worker contributions to these plans, often at rates as high as 50 or 100 percent.5
Investing through tax-deferred accounts is one way that investors who face otherwise high marginal
tax rates may be able to reduce the tax burden on their capital income.  It also raises a new set of issues,
which Shoven (1998) labels the “asset location problem.”  This concerns where assets with different risk
and tax characteristics should be located: in a taxable account, or in the tax-deferred account?  The asset
location problem has only started to receive attention from researchers, and it is not clear what guidelines
investors use in choosing which assets to hold in their tax-deferred accounts.
The Survey of Consumer Finances provides some information on asset allocation patterns in tax-
deferred accounts.  In 1995, for example, 50.3 percent of assets in IRAs and 62.7 percent of assets in
defined contribution pension plans were held in corporate stocks or mutual funds investing primarily in
corporate stocks. These fractions suggest that many households hold relatively low-tax assets, such as
corporate stock, in their tax-deferred accounts.  It is possible that some households face constraints on the
set of assets that they can hold in their tax-deferred accounts.  For example, some employers may invest
their matching contributions only in corporate stock.  The importance of such constraints, however, is not
clear.
For our purposes, the key point about tax-deferred accounts is that the incentive to invest through
these accounts is an increasing function of an investor’s marginal tax rate on investment income outside the
tax-deferred account.  Consider an investor who faces an ordinary income tax rate of t, and who has an
investment horizon of T.  If this investor holds a taxable bond, which yields an annual (continuously
compounded) return of r, then after T years, his after-tax wealth per dollar of initial investment is e
r(1-t)T.
Now consider what happens if the same investor allocates 1/(1-t) dollars to a tax-deferred account. 
This is the amount of before-tax income that would generate one dollar of after-tax income.  If the investor's
marginal tax rate at the time of retirement were the same as that when the dollar was earned, then at
retirement he would have e
rT.  The ratio of wealth in the tax-deferred investment to that in the taxable
investment is e
rtT, which is clearly increasing in the investor’s marginal tax rate.  In our empirical work, we
test whether households facing higher marginal tax rates invest more through tax-deferred accounts.6
2.  Empirical Evidence on Taxation and Portfolio Choice
Several previous studies have developed empirical evidence on how taxes affect portfolio choice. 
Feldstein (1976), King and Leape (1998), Hubbard (1985), Scholz (1994), and Samwick (forthcoming) are
the studies that are most directly related to our analysis.  Each of these studies examines how taxation
affects the portfolio decisions of U.S. households.
Feldstein (1976) analyzed portfolio data from the 1962 Survey of Financial Characteristics of
Consumers, which was conducted when the top marginal tax rate in the federal income tax code was 91
percent.  He found that a household’s income had a substantial effect on the mix of assets it held,
conditional on household net worth.  His primary finding was that equity-holding was more common among
higher income than lower-income households.  In essence, this study used the pattern of asset holdings by
income class, along with the link between income and tax rates, to conclude that tax rates affect portfolio
choice.  However, these results do not uniquely identify a model in which taxes affect portfolio choice.  Any
other model in which income, or a characteristic of households that is correlated with income, directly
affects portfolio choice is also consistent with this evidence.
King and Leape (1998) present related evidence on the relationship between marginal tax rates and
portfolio choice.  They find that tax variables affect the set of assets that investors decide to hold, but they
find very limited support for a link between tax rates and the fraction of the household’s portfolio that is
held in different assets.  They analyze data from a 1978 survey conducted by SRI International, and find that
many investors have zero holdings of many broad asset categories such as corporate stock, corporate bonds,
and tax-exempt bonds.  They also find that most investors who hold tax-favored assets such as equity or tax-
exempt bonds also hold more heavily taxed assets, contrary to the prediction of simple clientele models.
Hubbard’s (1985) study of data collected by the U.S. President’s Commission on Pension Policy
also finds a strong effect of taxes on asset allocation.  The estimates in this study of the marginal tax rates
facing different households, which are based on the NBER TAXSIM program, are substantially better than7
those in other studies, and they are more like the estimates that form the basis for our analysis.  This study
moves beyond Feldstein’s (1976) analysis by including marginal tax rates, as well as income, as explanatory
variables for portfolio structure.  The results suggest that variation in marginal tax rates, conditional on
income, helps to explain differences in portfolio structure across households.
Scholz (1994) examines changes in portfolio structure over time and the potential role of taxation in
driving these changes.  His analysis, based on the 1983 and 1989 Surveys of Consumer Finances, finds
relatively small changes in portfolio structure between these two years even though the Tax Reform Act of
1986 significantly affected marginal tax rates for many households.  One notable exception is some
restructuring of household debt into the tax-favored mortgage category. Maki (1996) provides further
evidence of the shift toward mortgage borrowing.  Yet as Gordon’s (1994) comments suggest, the long-term
nature of many investments, particularly those in real estate, personal businesses, and common stock, may
make it difficult to find portfolio adjustments only three years after a major tax reform such as that in 1986. 
(A similar argument can be raised with respect to our analysis.  Since we relate cross-sectional portfolio
patterns to current tax rates, we may not capture potentially important dynamic adjustments.)  The other
difficulty with evaluating Scholz' (1994) findings is that when there are systematic changes in the tax
structure, it can be difficult to determine how the portfolio of a given household should vary as a function of
its tax rate.  The predicted portfolio change can depend on the tax changes facing all households.
Samwick’s (forthcoming) analysis is also concerned with changes in portfolio structure that may
have been induced by the tax reforms of the last two decades.  This study uses an earlier version of the tax
imputation algorithm that we apply in the current paper, along with a less detailed econometric specification
than the one used here, to examine time-series changes in both real and financial portfolio holdings.  Despite
the clear cross-sectional relationship between marginal tax rates and portfolio structure that we find below,
the main result of Samwick’s (forthcoming) analysis is that changes in the portfolio composition of different
net worth groups over time are not primarily due to changes in their marginal tax rates.
In addition to these five studies of the broad issue of household portfolio structure, a number of8
other studies, summarized in Poterba (1999), have examined specific aspects of the link between taxation
and investor behavior.  Two sorts of studies are particularly notable in the current context.  The first are
those that explore whether investor marginal tax rates affect the dividend yield on investor portfolios.  Most
of these studies, most recently Scholz (1992), suggest that taxpayers facing higher dividend tax burdens hold
lower-yield stocks, although this effect is substantively small.
The second set of related studies are those that explore which households hold tax-exempt bonds. 
Feenberg and Poterba (1991) find that in 1988, roughly 85% of tax-exempt debt was held by taxpayers with
marginal tax rates of 28% or above.  Slightly less than ten percent of individual holdings of tax-exempt debt
were reported by taxpayers with marginal rates of less than 20%.  This suggests that even the lowest-taxed
assets in the financial spectrum are in some cases held by taxpayers with relatively low marginal tax rates, in
contrast to the predictions of simple clientele models.  This may be the result of inertia in portfolio choice,
transitory fluctuations in marginal tax rates, or other factors.
Our summary has focused on previous work that explores the structure of household portfolios in
the United States.  There is less work on taxation and household portfolio structure in other nations, largely
because of data limitations. Agell and Edin’s (1990) study of taxes and portfolio structure in Sweden and
Hochguertel’s (1998) work on household portfolios in the Netherlands are notable exceptions.
3.  Data Summary
This section presents the empirical background for our data analysis.  It begins by describing the
Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), along with summary information on the households in this survey and
the structure of their portfolios.  It also describes the algorithm that we use to impute marginal tax rates to
households in the SCF, and shows how the distribution of marginal tax rates changed between the 1983 and
1995 surveys.
3.1  The Survey of Consumer Finances, 1983-1995
The Surveys of Consumer Finances are a series of triennial surveys of the United States9
population designed to collect comprehensive data on household wealth.  The 1983 survey was designed
to be the first of a panel, but the re-interview surveys yielded only two thirds of the original sample in
1986 and one third in 1989.  New households supplemented the “panel” households in the 1989 sample,
and all waves since 1989 have been conducted as unrelated cross-sections using the same survey
questionnaire and sample design.  The years of the surveys span the major tax reform in 1986, and the
more modest reform in 1993.  Because of the small sample size and limited detail on asset categories in
the 1986 SCF, we do not use this survey in our analysis.
A key aspect of the SCFs is the oversampling of high-income households.  Each SCF sample is
comprised of an area-probability sample of the United States population and a sample of households
drawn from an Internal Revenue Service file of high-income returns.  Oversampling based on income
helps to equalize the probability of each dollar of wealth in the economy—rather than each household in
the population—appearing in the sample.
1  The distinction is important when analyzing the distribution
of assets and liabilities that are highly concentrated.  One drawback of the SCF is that to preserve the
anonymity of the high-income households in the sample, the household’s state of residence is not
reported.  This precludes the calculation of the household’s state income tax rate.
To study how taxes affect the allocation of financial assets, we classify the financial assets
enumerated in the SCF into eight categories based on their tax treatment.  These categories are taxable
equity held directly, taxable equity held in mutual funds, equity held in tax-deferred accounts, bonds held
in tax-deferred accounts, tax-exempt bonds, taxable bonds, interest bearing accounts, and other financial
assets.   We now present a more detailed description of each component and its general tax treatment:
Taxable Equity Held Directly.  This category includes all holdings of stocks outside of mutual
funds and tax-deferred retirement accounts, including brokerage accounts, investment trusts, investment
clubs, and shares in a company where a household member is employed.  Dividend payments to
                                                
1 The sampling design and construction of the sample weights that allow the two samples to be used together is
discussed in Avery, Elliehausen, and Canner (1984a, b), Heeringa, Conner and Woodburn (1994), Kennickell and
Woodburn (1992, 1997), and Kennickell, McManus, and Woodburn (1995).10
households are taxed each year at the household’s marginal tax rate on ordinary income.  Capital gains
and losses are taxed at the household’s capital gains tax rate when the gains are realized, not when they
accrue.  This results in an effective tax rate below the statutory rate.
Taxable Equity Held in Mutual Funds.  This category includes all holdings of stocks in mutual
funds.  Tax treatment is the same as in directly held equity, with the exception that mutual funds generate
both short- and long-term capital gains in the course of normal operations, even if households do not sell
or redeem their shares.  Short-term capital gains are subject to the household’s ordinary income tax rate.
Assets Held in Tax-Deferred Accounts.  This category includes all assets held in Individual
Retirement Accounts (IRAs), Keogh plans for the self-employed, and defined contribution (DC) pension
plans, including 401(k) plans and employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs).  Equity holdings include all
of the specific assets listed under taxable equity above.  Bond holdings include all of the forms listed
under taxable bonds and tax-exempt bonds below, as well as all responses not specifically coded as
equity.
2   As explained in the previous section, income on assets held in tax-deferred accounts is not
taxed until money is withdrawn from the account.  Withdrawals are taxed at the household’s ordinary
income tax rate.
Tax-Exempt Bonds.   This category includes all state and municipal bonds, whether held directly,
in money market accounts, or in mutual funds, but not in tax-deferred retirement accounts.  Interest from
these assets is tax-exempt.  Capital gains or losses resulting from sales prior to maturity are taxed at the
household’s marginal tax rate on capital gains.
Taxable Bonds.  This category includes federal government bonds, corporate bonds, and foreign
bonds, whether held directly or in mutual fund accounts, but not in tax-deferred retirement accounts. 
Interest payments on these assets are taxed each year at the household’s marginal tax rate on ordinary
income.  Capital gains and losses on these assets are taxable at the household’s capital gains tax rate only
if the assets are sold before maturity.  This category also includes savings bonds, which generate interest
                                                
2 Retirement account asset allocations were not reported in the 1983 SCF, so we impute them based on 1989 data.11
income that is taxed as ordinary income but only when the bonds are redeemed.
Interest Bearing Accounts.  This category includes checking accounts, saving accounts,
certificates of deposit, and money market accounts (except those that are invested in tax-exempt assets). 
Income from these accounts is taxed each year at the investor’s marginal ordinary income tax rate.
Other Financial Assets. This category consists primarily of the cash value of whole life insurance
policies and trust accounts.  These assets generally receive some form of tax-preferred treatment, since
the annual appreciation in the value of these assets is not taxed, but is deferred to a future date.
3.2  Summary Information on Portfolio Holdings
Table 1 presents summary information on the ownership probabilities for the asset categories in
each of the SCF data sets that we analyze.  There are several clear patterns in the data.  First, the
ownership of tax-deferred accounts increases substantially between 1983 and 1995.  Less than one
household in five had a tax-deferred account with equities in 1983, compared with nearly one household
in three by 1995.  The ownership of tax-deferred accounts with bond investments also rises, but not as
sharply, over this period.  Second, there is considerable variation in the distribution of assets across
households.  For example, less than half of the households hold stock in any form.  This variation
suggests that motives other than diversification are required to explain household portfolio choice.  The
limited degree of stock market participation has generated substantial recent research interest; see
Vissing-Jorgensen (1999) for an overview of this literature.
Table 2 shows the probability of a household holding each of the various asset categories,
conditional on positive holdings of the other asset categories.  For all asset categories except taxable stocks
and stock mutual funds, we combine ownership of assets directly with ownership through intermediaries
such as mutual funds.  The table does not suggest the presence of strong, tax-related asset clienteles.  For
example, about thirteen percent of the households who hold taxable bonds also hold tax-exempt bonds, and
56 percent of the households who own tax-exempt bonds also own taxable bonds.  Over half of the
households who own equity either directly or through taxable mutual funds also own equity in tax-deferred12
accounts, and nearly half of those who hold bonds in their tax-deferred accounts also hold some equity in
their tax-deferred accounts.
Table 2 reveals interesting portfolio patterns that may not be directly linked to tax-motivated
behavior.  More than forty percent of the households who hold stock through a mutual fund also own stock
directly, while only one quarter of those who report direct equity holdings also report indirect holdings. 
This may reflect the presence of substantial numbers of small investors who directly own stock in only one
or two firms, and are not using equity investment as an important part of a long-term financial plan.
Tables 3 and 4 provide additional information on the structure of household portfolios.  The first
panel of Table 3 shows the average household’s portfolio share for each asset category.  The average
portfolio share for directly held equity is 4.46 percent in 1995, and this share declines during our sample
period.  The average share of interest bearing accounts, by contrast, is 56 percent.  It is important to
remember that these are averages that weight all households equally; they differ from the dollar-weighted
share of each asset class in total portfolio value.
These statistics change dramatically when we compute conditional portfolio shares by averaging the
portfolio shares for each asset only across those households that report positive holdings of the asset.  In this
case, the average share of directly held corporate stock rises to 25 percent, and the average share of tax
exempt bonds, which are held by relatively few investors, rises from 1.3 percent to 22.5 percent.  The
dramatic difference between the conditional and the unconditional statistics is explained by the fact that
many households report zero holdings of many asset categories.
Table 4 presents a different measure of the role of each asset in the portfolio: the fraction of the
aggregate household portfolio that is accounted for by each asset category.  These numbers are weighted
average household portfolio shares, with each household weighted by the product of its sample weight and
its total financial assets.  The share of interest bearing accounts in the aggregate portfolio, 25 percent, is
significantly smaller than the household-weighted average portfolio share of these assets.  In 1995, 25
percent of household financial assets was in tax-deferred accounts.13
Table 4 tracks the decline indirect ownership of corporate stock and the rise in equity mutual fund
ownership over our sample period.  In 1983, directly-held corporate stock accounted for more than 26
percent of total household financial assets.  By 1992, this share had fallen to 17.6 percent.  Partly as a result
of rising share prices, it climbed to 19 percent by 1995.  At the same time, the share of equity mutual funds
in household financial assets rose from less than one percent in 1983 to 8.5 percent in 1995.  This growth in
mutual fund ownership does not include the coincident growing ownership of equity mutual funds through
tax-deferred accounts.  The table shows that “other financial assets,” primarily the cash value of whole life
insurance and the value of assets in trust accounts, account for almost 15 percent of the total assets of the
household sector.
3.3 Marginal Tax Rates on Investment Income, 1983-1995
To understand the empirical basis for our cross-sectional studies of tax rates and asset holding, it is
important to understand the shifting patterns over time in marginal tax rates for U.S. households.  In 1983,
the top marginal tax rate on interest and dividend income was 50 percent.  This represented a substantial
decline from the pre-1981 tax regime, when the top tax rate on such capital income flows was 70 percent. 
In 1983, long-term capital gains were taxed at a marginal tax rate equal to 40 percent of the statutory
marginal tax rate on dividends and interest.  This implied a top rate of 20 percent for high-income taxpayers.
 The decline in top marginal income tax rates that resulted from the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 is
potentially important, because the structure of portfolio holdings in 1983 may partly reflect choices made
under an earlier tax regime with higher marginal tax rates on dividend and interest income.
The first major tax reform during the time period spanned by our survey data is the Tax Reform Act
of 1986.  TRA86 continued the reduction in top marginal tax rates that had been part of ERTA, but it also
eliminated the capital gains tax preference for most taxpayers. For very high-income taxpayers, TRA86
reduced marginal tax rates from 50 percent in 1986 to 39 percent in 1987 to 28 percent in 1988.  TRA86
also introduced a hump-shaped pattern in marginal tax rates, with some taxpayers below the highest income14
groups facing a 33 percent marginal tax rate.
3
TRA86 eliminated the tax preference for realized capital gains that had been in effect in earlier
years, although the tax rate on such gains was capped at 28 percent.  This resulted in an increase in the
statutory tax rate on gains for many high-income taxpayers with realized gains.  For some high-income
taxpayers, the post-1986 tax code retained an advantage for capital gains relative to dividend or interest
income, but the statutory rate differential was only 5 percent in the early post-reform years.
4
A minor tax reform in 1990, and a more substantial change in 1993, partially reversed the changes
in the top marginal tax rate that had been enacted in 1986.  The 1990 tax reform, which affected tax returns
for 1991 and subsequent years, replaced the “hump shaped” distribution of marginal tax rates under the
1986 law, 15-28-33-28, with an alternative 15-28-31 structure.  Thus, it raised the top marginal tax rate on
the highest income households to 31 percent.  The 1993 reform, enacted as part of the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1993 (OBRA93), was a further step in this direction.  It raised the top marginal tax
rate to 36 percent for joint filers with incomes above $140,000 ($115,000 for single filers), and to 39.6
percent (36 percent plus a 10 percent surtax) for individual or married taxpayers with taxable incomes of
more than $250,000.  Many high-income taxpayers face tax rates above this statutory maximum of 39.6
percent as a result of the phase-out provisions governing various deductions.  OBRA93 also further
increased the share of Social Security benefits that could be subjected to tax from 50 to 85 percent.
Neither the 1990 nor the 1993 tax reforms affected the top marginal tax rate on capital gains.  By
1993, the tax rate differential between ordinary income, including dividends and interest, and realized
capital gains, exceeded 12 percent for many high-income taxpayers. The Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997,
which was enacted after the final year of SCF data that we analyze was collected, reduced the top capital
gains tax rate from 28 percent to 20 percent.
                                                
3 TRA86 also included up to 50 percent of Social Security benefits in taxable income for high-income recipients. 
Since investment income is a component of taxable income, this change raised the marginal tax rate on investment
income for this group.  Our tax calculator incorporates this.
4 Even when the statutory rate on capital gains equals that on dividends, the effective tax rate on capital gains can be less
than that on dividends as a result of tax deferral for unrealized but accrued gains.15
The effects of these various reforms can be summarized as follows.  First, TRA86 reduced the
incentive for high-income taxpayers to receive portfolio income in the form of capital gains rather than
dividend or interest.  These incentives for holding investments that generate capital gains rather than
ordinary income should be greatest in the 1983 SCF.  After 1993, the incentive for receiving capital gains
increased, although it did not return to pre-1986 levels.  Second, TRA86 reduced the incentive for high-
income taxpayers to hold tax-exempt debt.  It should have resulted in less concentrated ownership of
municipal bonds and tax-exempt bond funds, simply as a result of the overall reduction in marginal tax
rates. Third, TRA86 raised the capital gains tax rate, and thereby increased the benefit from tax-efficient
management of capital gains and losses.  Ceteris paribus, this should have discouraged high-income
taxpayers from owning mutual funds, which do not necessarily optimize their tax liabilities, and encouraged
direct ownership of gains-producing assets.  Finally, TRA86 reduced the incentive for high-income
taxpayers to invest through tax-deferred accounts, although OBRA93 partly reversed this.  TRA86 also
reduced the tax benefits of IRAs by eliminating the possibility of pre-tax contributions for households with
incomes above certain thresholds.  It also reduced the contribution limits on 401(k) plans from $30,000
(unindexed) to $7,245 (indexed).
Two notes of caution are important when considering how the personal tax reforms of the last two
decades have affected the incentives for portfolio investments.  First, the foregoing discussion does not
consider tax changes on firms that might, in general equilibrium, affect the structure of household portfolios.
 For example, the reduction in corporate tax rates in 1986 placed the top personal tax rate (28 percent)
below the top corporate tax rate (34 percent) and changed the incentives for organizing both investment and
other activities in corporate vs. individual form. Fluctuation in the corporate tax rate also should have
changed the incentives for corporations to finance their activities with debt versus equity securities, thereby
altering the supply of assets to the household sector.   Our empirical strategy asks whether, at a given point
in time, those households with higher marginal tax rates are more likely to hold tax-favored assets.  This is
not affected by the potential presence of corporate tax changes, but it is important to recognize that these16
changes can also have important effects on portfolio structure.  Analyzing how major tax reforms affect
portfolio structure requires a general equilibrium framework that considers asset supplies as well as asset
demands.
Second, our analysis of cross-sectional patterns in portfolio structure and tax rates provides
information on how a change in a household’s marginal tax rate might affect its portfolio structure.  It does
not necessarily provide information on the consequences of major changes in the tax system, since such
changes affect the marginal tax rates of many households, and relative tax burdens can be a critical factor in
portfolio choice.
3.4 Estimating Marginal Tax Rates for SCF Households
To assess each household’s tax incentive for holding different assets, we estimate each SCF
household’s marginal tax rate on ordinary investment income.  Although this tax rate is not the only
relevant aspect of tax policy for portfolio decisions, many of the tax incentives, especially the differences
in these incentives across households, are the direct result of cross-sectional variation in this tax rate. 
Our algorithm, which is described in the appendix, uses information on household income and
demographic structure to estimate marginal tax rates.
One difficulty with using a household’s marginal tax rate on another dollar of investment income
to measure tax incentives is that this marginal tax rate measure may itself be affected by portfolio
choices.  To avoid this problem, we calculate marginal tax rates as the difference in a household’s tax
liability at a base level of income, T(YB) and that base level of income (YB) plus an increment D.  The tax
liability at the incremented income level is T(YB + D).  Given our two estimates of total tax liability, we
calculate the household's marginal tax rate as  [T(YB + D) - T(YB)]/D.  
The marginal tax rate is a non-decreasing function of base income, which can in turn be affected
by a household’s portfolio choices.  A household that allocates its entire portfolio to tax advantaged
assets reduces its taxable income and, consequently, it may face a lower marginal tax rate than a
household that holds a portfolio of the same value invested in more heavily taxed assets.17
To purge the marginal tax rate calculation of this endogeneity, the base amount and the
increment must be unrelated to the household’s portfolio allocation decision.  We define the base level of
income for a household by artificially setting its investment income from interest, tax-exempt interest,
dividends, and capital gains to zero.  This choice of the base amount generates a “first dollar” marginal
tax rate on investment income.  The increment to income that we use to calculate the household's
marginal tax rate is five percent of the household’s total financial assets or $100, whichever is greater. 
We choose five percent to approximate the nominal return on taxable interest bearing assets over the
sample period.  If this increment to taxable income moves the household from one tax bracket to another,
the estimated marginal tax rate will be an average of the marginal tax rates corresponding to each of the
two income brackets.
Figure 1 summarizes our estimates of the marginal tax rate pattern in 1983, 1989, and 1995.  We
do not present 1992 because the tax code is very similar to that in 1989, and adding a fourth line makes
the figure more difficult to read.  The horizontal axis represents the percentiles of the distribution of the
marginal tax rate on ordinary income in each year.  The vertical axis represents the value of the marginal
tax rate, in percentage points. The distribution of marginal tax rates in each year is the result of applying
the tax-calculating algorithm to each household in the SCF sample, and then weighting each SCF
household by its sampling weight.
The figure shows that in each year, roughly 25 percent of the households face a zero marginal tax
rate. These are households whose current income is low enough that they do not have to pay tax.  Beyond
this point, the 1983 schedule is substantially different from that of the other three years, with many short,
flat portions denoting tax brackets, on the way up to a top rate of 50 percent.  The effect of TRA86 in
compressing the tax brackets is shown by the long, flat portions of the 1989 schedule, first at 15 percent
and then at 28 percent, rising up to a top rate of 33 percent.  The 1995 distribution is quite similar to that
for 1989, except at the highest percentiles.  There, the marginal tax rates in 1995 are higher than the
comparable rates in 1989.18
Summary statistics can further document the changing pattern of marginal tax rates.  The average
marginal tax rate in 1983 was 17.4 percent, compared with 14.1 percent in 1989 and 14.8 percent in
1995. The tax changes for high-income households that were enacted in 1990 and 1993 raised the
marginal tax rates at the top of the distribution, and these changes resulted in an increase in the average
for all households.  The 1990 and 1993 reforms had little effect, however, on households in the bottom
two thirds of the taxable income distribution.
Figure 2 is similar to Figure 1, but it does not weight households by sampling probabilities.  The
presence of the high-income sample (which has low sample weights) is evident in the expansion of the
tax brackets at the top of the distribution.  The difference between Figures 1 and 2 highlights the
oversampling of high-income households in the SCF.  It is precisely this oversampling that makes the
SCF more attractive than other surveys for studying how taxes affect portfolio decisions by high-income
households.
4.  Econometric Framework
We analyze two aspects of the household portfolio problem: the decision of whether or not to
allocate any funds to a given asset category, and the decision of how much to allocate to each asset category.
 We estimate probit models for asset ownership and tobit models for portfolio shares as a function of the
marginal tax rate, controlling for a range of income, wealth, and demographic variables discussed below.  A
statistically significant coefficient estimate on the variable measuring the household’s marginal tax rate
supports the view that taxes affect portfolio behavior.
To formalize our analysis, we denote positive holdings of asset j by household i with an indicator
variable, Dij, set equal to unity if household i holds asset j and to zero otherwise. Analogously, we define Sij
as the share of asset j in household i’s portfolio of financial assets. In each of these cases, we define a latent
variable that indicates the household's preferred choice.  In the probit case, the latent variable D*ij indicates
the desire to own the asset:19
(1)  j i j i j i e X D ,
*
, + = b .
In the tobit case, the latent variable indicates the share of the household’s portfolio that would notionally be
allocated to the asset:
(2)  j i j i j i u X S ,
*
, + = g
Each tobit is estimated allowing for censoring both at zero—when the household does not hold the asset—
and at one—when the household invests its entire portfolio in one asset class.  Censoring at zero is much
more common than censoring at one.  The standard deviation of ui,j is denoted by sj.
Equilibrium models of portfolio choice and taxation, as we noted above, predict which households
in a cross-section should hold particular assets, and how much of their portfolio they should allocate to these
assets, as a function of the household’s position in the marginal tax rate distribution. In any equilibrium,
households with high marginal tax rates are predicted to hold portfolios that are skewed toward tax
advantaged assets.
Unfortunately, it is difficult to compare marginal tax rates across years because the entire
distribution of tax rates changes over time.  For example, a marginal tax rate of 33 percent is the maximum
in 1989 but only the 80
th percentile in 1983.  We therefore take a two-part approach to analyzing the SCF
data.  First, we estimate probit and tobit models on each cross-section data set.  We present full results for
the 1995 sample year and subsequently compare the effects of marginal tax rates across cross-sectional
estimates for all sample years.  Second, both to increase the precision of the estimated coefficients and to
exploit the variation in tax rates that is due to tax reform, we also present results for all four SCF sample
years pooled.  When we estimate probit or tobit models on the pooled data, we include dummy variables for
the sample year, so that the marginal tax rate variable (like all explanatory variables) is rescaled to reflect its
deviation from the year-specific mean.  The pooled data set provides a larger data sample than the sample
from any single year. 
We estimate these models for eight different asset classes in each sample.  One potential difficulty20
with our approach is that the errors in the latent variable models that generate asset demand are correlated
across equations.  In our specifications, however, the set of explanatory variables, Xi, is the same for all
asset classes.  If the specifications were linear, they would form a system of seemingly unrelated regressions
in which the coefficient estimates, bj and gj, would not depend on the cross-equation correlation matrix. 
Due to the nonlinearity of the probit and tobit functional forms, however, the value of the likelihood
function can be improved by maximizing jointly over these coefficients and the parameters of the
correlation matrix.
Estimating eight-variate probit and tobit models is a non-trivial computational problem.  When we
experimented with smaller four-dimensional systems, we either had difficulties avoiding numerically
unstable regions of the parameter space, or achieving convergence in reasonable time frames.  To obtain
some information on the nature and importance of these cross-correlations, however, we estimated a set of
bivariate probits and bivariate tobits, considering each possible pair of asset classes.  There were very few
substantial changes in the coefficients in either of the probit or tobit models relative to the coefficients that
we estimated in the univariate models.  We therefore present estimates of the coefficients under the
assumption that the correlation matrices for the errors in the latent variable equations, (1) and (2), are
diagonal.  We also report our estimates of the correlation matrices from the bivariate equations.
Two complications arise in the tobit specifications for portfolio shares but not in the discrete
choice probit equations.  The first is that the marginal effect of each explanatory variable on the portfolio
share in asset j must sum to zero across all assets.  These restrictions need not apply to the marginal
effects in the ownership probits, because ownership of one financial asset does not preclude ownership of
any other.  In a system of linear regressions, this condition is true of the coefficients because it is true in
the data.  Due to the nonlinearity in the tobit, this restriction must be imposed for every variable.
As shown in Greene (2000, p. 909), the marginal effect of explanatory variable k on the expected















































where F denotes the cumulative standard normal distribution function, the summation on the right hand
side of (3) is over households in the sample, and X
k is the kth element of the vector of explanatory
variables that we use to explain portfolio holdings.  Intuitively, the marginal effect of the variable X
k on
the amount that household I holds in asset j is simply the product of its coefficient in the equation for the
jth asset, and the probability that the latent variable for a given observation falls between the upper and
lower limits associated with the Tobit.  The constraint that a change in explanatory variable k has no


















































Imposing these restrictions (one for each explanatory variable k) on the coefficients requires estimating the
system of eight equations jointly because the restriction for each explanatory variable depends on all of the
parameters in all of the equations.   However, when we assume that the errors in different equations are
uncorrelated, the log-likelihood function is the sum of the log-likelihood functions for each separate asset
demand equation.  This simplifies the estimation problem, because we can evaluate eight univariate normal
integrals, rather that the eight-dimensional normal integral that would be associated with the problem
assuming correlated errors.
The second complication in the portfolio share tobits is that 1,170 households (7.57 percent of the
15,451 total) report no holdings of any financial assets.
5  We assume, for estimating the tobits but not the
probits, that these households have some holdings of interest bearing accounts that are not reported in the
survey.  We therefore assume that these households are censored at 1 for interest bearing accounts and 0 for
all other assets.  The estimated coefficients are similar in size and significance when these households are
                                                
5 There are 390 such households (9.51 percent) in 1983, 238 (7.57 percent) in 1989, 268 (6.86 percent) in 1992, and22
excluded from the sample and when we adopt this crude data fix.
We control for many other explanatory variables that might also influence household portfolio
decisions through their correlation with household risk aversion or investment opportunities.  These include
categorical variables for household income, net worth, and basic demographic attributes, such as age,
gender, marital status, and education of the household head.  We defined the head of a married household to
be the spouse with the higher labor income or, if both spouses earn the same income (usually zero), the
older spouse. We also include dummy variables for the occupation and industry of the head of household.
 The occupation categories are Executives or Professionals; Clerical, Technical, and Sales; Service
Workers; Crafts; Laborers; Farmers; Retired; and Not in the Labor Force.  The industry categories are
Agriculture and Forestry; Mining, Construction, and Manufacturing; Services; and Public
Administration.
   Table 5 shows the proportions of the sample respondents in each of the discrete categories for each
cross-sectional survey.  These proportions are not weighted by sample weights and hence do not necessarily
reflect the overall population.  All income and net worth categories are reported in thousands of constant
1995 dollars. Comparing sample years, the income tabulations show movement toward higher real income
categories, away from income levels under $50,000 and toward income levels over $75,000.  Most of the
change occurred between the 1983 and 1989 surveys, as the distributions for 1989 and 1995 are quite
similar.  There was also movement toward higher net worth categories, with categories under $250,000
losing observations and categories over $250,000 gaining observations.  These changes partly reflect the
increase in real incomes, and especially real net worth, over the period that we study.
5.  Empirical Findings: Asset Ownership Patterns
This section presents our estimates of probit models of asset ownership.  Table 6 shows the
coefficients and standard errors for each of the eight asset categories for the 1995 survey year.  The
                                                                                                                                                            
274 (6.37 percent) in 1995.23
coefficient for the marginal tax rate is positive and statistically significant in the equations for taxable equity
mutual funds, tax-deferred equity, tax-deferred bonds, and tax-exempt bonds.  All of these assets are taxed
less heavily than interest bearing accounts.  Among the assets that are taxed at less than the ordinary
marginal tax rate, only taxable equity held directly has a statistically insignificant coefficient.  The asset
categories that generate income that is taxed at the ordinary income tax rate, such as taxable bonds, interest
bearing accounts, and other financial assets, have positive but statistically insignificant coefficients.  These
results suggest that higher marginal tax rates are associated with greater ownership of tax-advantaged assets.
The coefficients on the income and wealth categories are also informative.  Most asset categories
show an increasing probability of ownership at higher income and wealth levels.  For the income
coefficients, most of the increase occurs in moving from income under $15,000 (the omitted category) to
income levels up to $50,000.  Similarly, for the net worth coefficients, most of the increase occurs in
moving from net worth under $50,000 to net worth levels up to $250,000.  Beyond those levels, there is
little additional effect of income or wealth on the ownership probabilities.  The exceptions in both cases are
for taxable equity held directly and tax-exempt bonds, which show steady increases in ownership
probabilities as income and wealth increase, even at high income and wealth levels and even after
controlling for the household’s marginal tax rate.
The remaining rows of the table show the coefficients for the demographic variables.  Higher
education, at least through the level of a college degree, is associated with a higher probability of
ownership for each of the assets.  There are a variety of patterns of ownership by age across assets.  For
households over age 25, the probability of owning tax-deferred equity decreases with age.  The same is
true for taxable bonds, up to age 65.  For tax-exempt bonds, households over age 65 have much higher
probabilities of ownership, other things equal.  Poterba and Samwick (1997) present a more detailed
analysis of the age profiles of asset ownership and portfolio allocation, along with tests for the
differences in portfolio composition across birth cohorts.  None of the coefficients on the gender of the
household head are statistically significant.  Married households are significantly more likely than24
unmarried households to own equity and bonds in tax-deferred accounts. They are significantly less
likely to own tax-exempt bonds and more likely to own taxable bonds.
The next two tables show the effect of including additional years of data in the analysis.  Table 7
presents the results for the eight probits for asset ownership estimated on all four waves of the SCF pooled
together.  The coefficient for the marginal tax rate in all of the specifications for assets that are taxed more
heavily than interest bearing accounts is again positive in all equations.  The coefficient is statistically
significant in all equations except for that for other financial assets.  Ownership probabilities continue to be
increasing functions of income, net worth, and education, especially when moving up the first two or three
categories.  The coefficients on age and other demographic variables are also similar to those in Table 6.
Table 8 presents the marginal effects of the marginal tax rate in each equation when estimated on
each sample year separately and on all sample years pooled together.
6  Asterisks next to a number indicate
that the coefficient on which the marginal effect is based is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. 
For example, the value of 0.4076 for taxable equity mutual funds in the pooled sample indicates that
increasing a household’s marginal tax rate by 0.1, or 10 percentage points, would increase the probability of
ownership by 0.04076, or about 4 percentage points.  The second panel of the table shows that this
increment is 57.2 percent of the baseline ownership probability (7.12 percent) that we reported in Table 1.
When expressed as a percentage of the baseline ownership probabilities, the effect of a 10-
percentage point increase the marginal tax rate varies considerably across asset categories.  Both tax-exempt
bonds and taxable equity mutual funds show large effects of the marginal tax rate.  The increases are 49.7
and 37.5 percent in 1995, respectively, and the effects are even larger in the pooled sample.  In contrast, the
three categories taxed as ordinary income—taxable bonds, interest bearing accounts, and other financial
assets—show smaller percentage effects.  The same is true of taxable equity held directly.  The percentage
effects of a 10 percentage point change in the marginal tax rate on holdings of tax-deferred accounts were
about 20 percent for both equity and bonds in 1983.  Over time, the absolute effects (shown in the top panel)25
have fallen and the baseline ownership probabilities have increased, resulting in substantially smaller
percentage effects, approximately 8 percent of baseline, by 1995.
The econometric results presented in Tables 6 through 8 show that ownership decisions for
different financial assets are correlated through the effects of observable variables such as the marginal tax
rate, income, and wealth.  Ownership decisions may also be correlated through the presence of unobservable
factors, which are captured in the error terms in the latent variable equations.  To investigate the nature of
these correlations, Table 9 shows the correlation matrix of the residuals from all possible pairs of bivariate
probits for pairs of asset classes.  These estimates are based on the pooled sample.  All of the correlations
are positive, indicating that once a household owns assets in any one asset class, it is more likely to own
assets in each of the other asset classes as well, even conditioning on income and wealth.  The of the
correlations involving tax-deferred bonds, tax-deferred equity, and other financial assets are smaller than
those involving tax-exempt bonds and equity mutual funds. 
The positive correlations may have several explanations.  One is that establishing ownership of one
asset, such as an equity mutual fund, reduces the marginal cost of establishing ownership of other assets. 
For example, once an investor does enough research and pays the fees to own a stock index fund, it may be
easier for to establish ownership of a municipal bond fund at the same fund family.  Another possibility is
that potential investors differ in their costs—out of pocket, psychic, and otherwise—of researching
investment options and making investments.  Those who face lower costs, for example because they are
more skilled at library or internet research, may be more likely to invest in not just one, but many, asset
categories.
6.  Empirical Findings: The Allocation of Household Portfolios
We now turn to our findings for household portfolio shares, which correspond to our estimates of
tobit models.  Our estimation procedure accounts for the censoring of portfolio shares at both zero and one
                                                                                                                                                            
6 The marginal effect of x
k in the probit equation for asset j equals the sample average value of f(bj’xi)bj
k.26
and constrains the sum of the marginal effects of each explanatory variable across the eight portfolio shares
to be zero.  As in the previous section, we first present results for the 1995 survey year, followed by results
for the pooled sample.  We then discuss the marginal effects of tax rate changes on the structure of
household portfolios.
Table 10 shows the coefficients and standard errors for each of the eight tobit equations for the
1995 survey year.  An increase in the marginal tax rate leads to statistically significant increases in the share
of the portfolio allocated to taxable equity in mutual funds and to tax-exempt bonds.  It leads to a significant
decrease in the portfolio share allocated to interest bearing accounts.  The coefficients for both equity and
bonds in tax-deferred accounts are positive but insignificant.  Taxable equity held directly, taxable bonds,
and other financial assets have negative coefficients that are not statistically significant.
Marginal effects are presented in Table 11, with asterisks indicating statistical significance of the
coefficient at the 5 percent level.  Once again the estimates describe the effect of a ten percentage point
increase in the marginal tax rate of a single household, holding constant the marginal tax rates of all other
households.  A 10 percentage point increase in the marginal tax rate increases the household’s portfolio
share in taxable equity mutual funds by 0.1*0.0495 = 0.00495, or 0.495 percentage points.  This is
approximately 17 percent of the underlying unconditional average portfolio share of 2.87 percent, repeated
(from Table 3) in the top row of the table.  The same tax rate increase would induce a 0.334 percentage
point (28 percent) increase in the share in tax-exempt bonds and a 0.926 percentage point (2 percent)
reduction in the share allocated to interest bearing accounts.
Tables 10 and 11 also show the effects of income, net worth, and demographics on portfolio shares.
 Higher levels of income are associated with higher portfolio shares of taxable equity held directly, tax-
exempt bonds, and taxable bonds and lower portfolio shares of interest bearing accounts and other financial
assets.  Higher levels of net worth are associated with lower portfolio shares of tax-deferred equity, tax-
deferred bonds, and interest bearing accounts and with higher portfolio shares of all other financial assets. 
Higher levels of education are associated with lower portfolio shares of interest bearing accounts and other27
financial assets and with higher portfolio shares of all other assets except tax-deferred bonds.  There is little
systematic effect of age and gender.  Married households tend to have greater portfolio shares of tax-
deferred equity and bonds and lower portfolio shares of interest bearing accounts, taxable equity held
directly, and tax-exempt bonds.
Tables 12 and 13 present estimates analogous to those in Tables 10 and 11, but now for the pooled
SCF sample. For the marginal tax rate, there are some differences in the results for the pooled sample and
those for the 1995 sample.  The coefficients on directly held equity and taxable bonds are positive, but still
statistically insignificant, in the pooled sample.  The marginal effect on tax-deferred bonds is nearly twice as
large in the pooled as in the 1995 sample.  The marginal effect on interest bearing accounts is about 50
percent larger in magnitude.  Despite these differences, the overall patterns are similar in the two cases.  A
10-percentage point increase in the marginal tax rate is predicted to result in about 1.7 percent of the
portfolio shifting from interest bearing accounts and other financial assets to taxable equity mutual funds,
tax-deferred equity and bonds, and tax-exempt bonds.
 7 
As in the probit models in the previous section, we also consider the correlation matrix for the
residuals from the eight separate tobit equations. To estimate the correlation matrix, we fix the coefficients
at the values estimated from the pooled sample, i.e. at the coefficients shown in Table 12.  For each pair of
tobit models, we then maximize the joint likelihood function as a function of the correlation between the
residuals in the two latent variable equations.  Table 14 presents the resulting correlation estimates. There
are two groups of assets.  The first group consists of interest bearing accounts, other financial assets, and
tax-deferred bonds.  With one exception, namely the correlation between tax-deferred equity and tax-
deferred bond holdings, the correlations between these assets and all other asset categories are negative. 
The second group consists of all three types of equity, tax-exempt bonds, and taxable bonds.  These
                                                
7 Recall that in our estimation procedure, the marginal effects of each variable are constrained to sum to zero across the
eight equations.  This involves 36 (33) constraints in the pooled (annual) sample.  No single Lagrange multiplier on
these constraints is estimated to be statistically significantly different from zero, and the p-value for the joint significance
of the multipliers is 0.1068 for the 1995 sample year.  For the pooled sample and for the cross-sectional estimates for all
other years, the p-value exceeds 0.6.28
categories are positively correlated with each other, suggesting that when households decide to allocate their
portfolio to any one of these assets, they are also likely to increase their portfolio shares for other assets in
this group. This may reflect underlying differences in the financial sophistication that investors need to
participate in each of these asset markets, or it may reflect other factors.
Finally, we consider what our estimates suggest about the marginal effects of the tax rate on
portfolio choices.  Table 15 shows these marginal effects for all sample years.  As in the ownership probits
summarized in Table 8, the largest percentage effects are for equity mutual funds and tax-exempt bonds. 
This is in part because the unconditional average shares for these assets are fairly low.  The effect of the
marginal tax rate on the share in tax-deferred accounts is positive in all sample years.  In the 1995
estimation, we estimate that a ten percentage point increase in the marginal tax rate increases the portfolio
shares of tax-deferred bonds and equity by about 4 percent of baseline.  The effect on interest bearing
accounts is always negative and significant, and the effect on other financial assets is negative and
significant in all years except 1983.
7.  Conclusions and Future Directions
A household’s marginal tax rate on ordinary income displays a substantial correlation both with the
set of assets that the household owns and with the share of the household’s portfolio that is allocated to
various asset categories.  The results are broadly consistent with simple theoretical models of portfolio
selection in the presence of taxes.  Households with higher marginal income tax rates are more likely to own
tax-advantaged assets such as publicly traded stock and tax-exempt bonds than are comparable households
with lower marginal tax rates.  They are also more likely to hold assets in tax-deferred accounts such as
IRAs, Keoghs, and defined contribution pension plans.   These findings emerge in our analysis both of
ownership decisions and of the allocation of portfolio shares.  They also emerge even after we control for
differences in income and net worth across households; these are factors that may have confounded some
previous studies of taxation and portfolio choice. While we find that higher marginal tax rate households are29
more likely to hold equities, which are tax favored relative to bonds, we also find that they are likely to hold
equity mutual funds, rather than directly held stocks.  Dickson and Shoven (1995) note that many equity
mutual funds impose much higher taxes on their investors than the investors would face if they purchased
stocks directly.
The findings presented here suggest several directions for further research.  One of the most
important concerns the efficiency cost of tax-induced distortions in portfolio structure.  We have not yet
estimated a structural model of household portfolio behavior.  A natural next step would involve specifying
and estimating such a model, and using it to calculate the deadweight loss imposed by the tax system.
A second potential extension concerns asset supply.  Our results suggest that a tax change like that
in 1993, which increased the marginal tax rate on households at the top of the income distribution, should
increase the demand among these households for tax-exempt bonds and for investments through tax-
deferred accounts.  The move from taxable to tax-deferred accounts can be accomplished without any
changes in the supplies of assets in the economy.  To increase the holdings of tax-exempt bonds among
high-income households, however, it is necessary to either reduce the holdings among lower-income
households, or to increase the supply of these bonds.  Combining our demand-side analysis with a plausible
model of asset supply, and studying the resulting patterns of asset allocation in general equilibrium, is a
natural direction for additional work.
Another set of issues that we have not explored concerns non-portfolio risks, nontraded assets, and
the structure of portfolio demands.  A substantial recent literature, particularly Heaton and Lucas (1997),
has considered the link between risky human capital and household demand for common stock.  There is
some evidence that households with greater risk exposure through their labor income are less likely to hold
risky corporate equities.  While our control variables for income, net worth, and demographics proxy for the
risk in human capital, combining a detailed analysis of tax incentives with information on other factors that
may influence household demands for risky assets seems like a natural venue for future exploration.
Finally, we have not considered the speed and method of portfolio adjustment in the aftermath of a30
tax change.  Our analysis cannot shed light on whether investors sell existing asset holdings to adjust their
portfolios when tax reform shifts the relative after-tax returns on different assets, or whether adjustment
takes place primarily through differential purchasing patterns for new assets.  This distinction could have
important implications for the time horizon over which household portfolios adjust.  Kennickell and Starr-
McCluer (1996) present descriptive statistics on the panel of the SCF covering 1983 and 1989.  These data
may yield further insight on the dynamics of portfolio adjustment. The role of tax changes in stimulating
asset sales and in portfolio adjustment more generally is another direction for extending this work.31
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APPENDIX: ESTIMATING MARGINAL TAX RATES IN THE SCF
Our algorithm for estimating marginal tax rates proceeds line-by-line down the Form 1040 and
other relevant tax schedules. Filing status is determined by the household’s marital status, with all
married households assumed to file a joint return.  Personal exemptions are estimated based on marital
status and the number of dependents in the household under age 18.  The SCF reports information on
many of the components of total income.  Wages and salaries, taxable interest, tax-exempt interest,
dividends, alimony received, rents and royalties, business income, and farm income are all
straightforward and similarly defined in the SCF and for tax purposes.
Other components of income required for the 1040 are not reported in the SCF, or are not
reported in as much detail on the survey.  We have no data on refunds of state and local income taxes,
other gains, and IRA distributions, so we set these income components to zero. All pension and
unemployment compensation that is reported is assumed to be taxable.  Another approach would be to
impute aggregate amounts or taxable shares based on reports of analogous quantities in the IRS Statistics
of Income.  Refining the precise calculations of marginal tax rates is the subject of work in progress.
Social Security benefits are taxed according to the formula appropriate to each year. 
The remaining component of adjusted gross income (AGI) is adjustments to total income.  The
self-employment tax is applied to all business and farm income.  Households are assumed to claim the
maximum IRA deductions consistent with their reported balances and individual earnings.  The SCF also
includes data on alimony paid, and this is an adjustment to income.  There is no data on any other
adjustments that are allowed on form 1040, such as moving expenses, so we set these items to zero. 
Subtracting the total adjustments from total income gives the household’s AGI.
The next step in the computations is to estimate the household’s possibility of itemizing
deductions on Schedule A.  The SCF reliably reports information on interest payments and charitable
contributions.  Deductions for local taxes are based on the reported value of real estate and personal
property subject to tax.  Itemization is determined by comparing the sum of these deductions to the
standard deduction appropriate for the household’s age and filing status.  The lack of reported
information on other possible deductions, such as medical expenses, state and local income taxes,
casualty losses, and job expenses is the biggest handicap in calculating tax rates in the SCF.  The
household’s exemptions and deductions are then subjected to the limits based on income in the later
survey years.  Subtracting them from AGI yields the household’s taxable income.  Applying the
appropriate tax rate schedule to taxable income gives the household’s tax liability.  Total taxes include
this amount plus self-employment and alternative minimum taxes.  We did not compute tax credits such
as the Earned Income Credit, since the SCF does not contain the information needed to evaluate many of
the credits.
The household’s marginal tax rate on any type of income can be calculated by running this
algorithm twice—once with a base amount and then with the base amount plus an increment.  The




















































1983 1989 1995Pooled 1995 1992 1989 1983
Directly Held Equity 17.88 16.41 18.13 17.91 19.08
Equity Mutual Funds 7.12 11.26 8.35 5.86 3.03
Tax-Deferred Equity 24.00 30.40 25.67 20.42 19.51
Tax-Deferred Bonds 29.38 30.54 30.35 30.54 26.10
Tax-Exempt Bonds 5.74 6.44 6.79 6.40 3.31
Taxable Bonds 26.40 26.17 27.29 28.14 23.99
Interest Bearing Accounts 86.90 87.22 87.24 85.52 87.63
Other Financial Assets 43.08 42.96 44.56 48.29 36.52
Source:  Author’s tabulations from the Surveys of Consumer Finances, 1983-1995.
Notes:
 1) Households are weighted by sample weights in each year.
 2) Sample years are equally weighted in the pooled sample.
Table 1: Ownership Probabilities, by YearDirectly Equity Tax Tax Tax Interest Other
Held Mutual Deferred Deferred Exempt Taxable Bearing Financial
Equity Funds Equity Bonds Bonds Bonds Accounts Assets
Directly Held Equity 100.00 28.23 52.61 45.38 19.27 49.65 99.72 60.10
Equity Mutual Funds 41.13 100.00 58.86 45.85 29.36 57.08 99.56 57.28
Tax-Deferred Equity 28.40 21.81 100.00 54.36 11.26 41.58 97.63 53.13
Tax-Deferred Bonds 24.38 16.91 54.10 100.00 9.68 39.66 96.96 52.96
Tax-Exempt Bonds 49.11 51.35 53.14 45.92 100.00 55.60 98.84 67.27
Taxable Bonds 31.13 24.56 48.30 46.28 13.68 100.00 98.00 58.10
Interest Bearing Accounts 18.76 12.86 34.03 33.95 7.30 29.41 100.00 46.33
Other Financial Assets 22.96 15.02 37.60 37.66 10.09 35.40 94.08 100.00
Notes:
 1) Each entry is the probability that a household owns the asset in the column, conditional on owning the asset in the row.
 2) Households are weighted by sample weights in each year.
Table 2: Conditional Probabilities of Asset Ownership, SCF 1995Pooled 1995 1992 1989 1983
Directly Held Equity 4.46 4.15 4.34 4.40 4.94
Equity Mutual Funds 1.36 2.87 1.48 0.84 0.25
Tax-Deferred Equity 7.83 11.77 8.10 5.76 5.70
Tax-Deferred Bonds 10.04 10.78 10.92 10.57 7.89
Tax-Exempt Bonds 1.29 1.19 1.74 1.54 0.68
Taxable Bonds 3.70 3.75 3.90 3.89 3.24
Interest Bearing Accounts 55.97 49.71 54.41 56.99 62.76
Other Financial Assets 15.36 15.78 15.11 16.00 14.54
Pooled 1995 1992 1989 1983
Directly Held Equity 24.93 25.28 23.94 24.58 25.89
Equity Mutual Funds 19.13 25.53 17.78 14.39 8.23
Tax-Deferred Equity 32.64 38.73 31.55 28.21 29.22
Tax-Deferred Bonds 34.16 35.30 35.97 34.60 30.22
Tax-Exempt Bonds 22.45 18.45 25.55 24.13 20.60
Taxable Bonds 14.00 14.34 14.28 13.83 13.52
Interest Bearing Accounts 64.40 56.99 62.37 66.64 71.62
Other Financial Assets 35.65 36.73 33.91 33.14 39.81
Source:  Author’s tabulations from the Surveys of Consumer Finances, 1983-1995.
Notes:
 1) Households are weighted by sample weights in each year.
 2) Sample years are equally weighted in the pooled sample.
 3) The unconditional average refers to all households.  The conditional average refers to 
      only those households who have positive amounts of the asset.
Pooled 1995 1992 1989 1983
Directly Held Equity 20.61 18.99 17.61 19.39 26.43
Equity Mutual Funds 3.84 8.48 3.57 2.44 0.88
Tax-Deferred Equity 10.23 14.76 12.36 8.02 5.80
Tax-Deferred Bonds 11.35 11.17 13.66 11.72 8.86
Tax-Exempt Bonds 8.01 6.93 8.91 9.06 7.15
Taxable Bonds 6.40 6.75 6.01 6.59 6.27
Interest Bearing Accounts 24.81 19.31 24.38 27.84 27.73
Other Financial Assets 14.73 13.61 13.49 14.95 16.87
8,840 7,082 7,088 5,391
Source:  Author’s tabulations from the Surveys of Consumer Finances, 1983-1995.
Notes:
 1) Households are weighted by sample weights in each year.
 2) Sample years are equally weighted in the pooled sample.
Financial Assets (Billions of 1995 $):
Table 3: Average Portfolio Shares, by Year
Unconditional Averages
Conditional Averages
Table 4: Aggregate Portfolio Shares, by YearPooled 1995 1992 1989 1983
Income
 0 - 15 19.11 16.70 18.23 19.66 22.06
 15 - 25 14.10 13.63 13.88 11.61 16.70
 25 - 50 24.89 24.80 21.97 23.19 29.08
 50 - 75 12.64 12.63 12.03 13.27 12.75
 75 - 100 6.11 6.65 6.63 6.65 4.63
 100 - 250 10.30 11.51 11.88 11.20 6.82
 250 + 12.85 14.07 15.39 14.41 7.97
Net Worth
 0 - 50 36.12 33.68 35.33 31.72 42.80
 50 - 100 12.43 11.89 10.14 11.17 16.13
 100 - 250 16.41 14.82 15.03 17.31 18.72
 250 - 1000 15.00 16.14 15.23 17.72 11.48
 1000 + 20.04 23.47 24.27 22.08 10.87
Education
 Some High School 18.82 13.63 15.31 20.24 26.52
 High School Diploma 25.83 25.08 24.17 25.61 28.37
 Some College 19.60 21.75 19.64 18.14 18.43
 College Degree 17.66 20.28 20.61 16.99 12.60
 Post College 18.10 19.26 20.28 19.03 14.09
Age
 Under 25 4.67 4.65 4.63 3.05 5.95
 25 - 34 17.07 16.00 16.18 14.70 20.86
 35 - 44 21.25 21.66 21.79 22.05 19.72
 45 - 54 19.54 21.63 19.92 19.85 16.74
 55 - 64 15.93 14.96 14.90 17.66 16.62
 65 + 21.53 21.10 22.58 22.69 20.11
Female 34.86 36.01 35.23 34.97 33.22
Married 66.14 66.85 65.69 68.22 64.22
Households (Millions) 99.01 95.92 93.02 83.92
Observations 15451 4299 3906 3143 4103
Source:  Author’s tabulations from the Surveys of Consumer Finances, 1983-1995.
Notes:
 1) Tabulations are not weighted.
 2) Income and Net Worth are reported in thousands of 1995 dollars.
 3) Demographic characteristics pertain to the head of household.
 4) Occupation and Industry categories are included in regressions but not reported.
Table 5: Sample Composition, by YearParameter Coeff. Std Error Coeff. Std Error Coeff. Std Error Coeff. Std Error
Constant -2.2745 0.3680 -2.3369 0.3856 -1.9020 0.3290 -1.7500 0.3333
MTR 0.0352 0.2394 1.0932 0.2492 0.6063 0.2319 0.6964 0.2267
Income
 15 - 25 0.3472 0.1150 0.1728 0.1416 0.4770 0.1093 0.3722 0.0961
 25 - 50 0.5930 0.1080 0.4258 0.1294 0.7521 0.1023 0.6378 0.0921
 50 - 75 0.6934 0.1247 0.3877 0.1446 0.8578 0.1202 0.5632 0.1111
 75 - 100 0.8196 0.1390 0.4093 0.1570 0.9632 0.1367 0.4666 0.1272
 100 - 250 0.8127 0.1360 0.3872 0.1528 0.9154 0.1366 0.5681 0.1258
 250 + 1.1706 0.1499 0.3258 0.1641 0.8807 0.1509 0.2901 0.1397
Net Worth
 50 - 100 0.3011 0.0951 0.3890 0.1068 0.3095 0.0776 0.4445 0.0744
 100 - 250 0.6247 0.0866 0.6013 0.0996 0.3912 0.0777 0.5372 0.0731
 250 - 1000 0.8842 0.0919 1.0895 0.1022 0.4717 0.0852 0.5803 0.0809
 1000 + 1.3438 0.1083 1.1749 0.1174 0.3965 0.1056 0.4666 0.0992
Education
 High Schl 0.3329 0.1089 0.2104 0.1208 0.1776 0.0930 0.2325 0.0824
 Some Col 0.4272 0.1116 0.2748 0.1222 0.3150 0.0952 0.2349 0.0862
 Col Deg 0.6461 0.1138 0.5141 0.1233 0.4653 0.1003 0.2815 0.0926
 Post Col 0.6711 0.1165 0.6406 0.1260 0.4948 0.1032 0.2760 0.0962
Age
 25 - 34 0.0574 0.1700 -0.2160 0.1746 0.3868 0.1372 0.1399 0.1317
 35 - 44 -0.0686 0.1686 -0.2366 0.1715 0.2889 0.1376 0.2597 0.1299
 45 - 54 -0.1170 0.1700 -0.2966 0.1736 0.2062 0.1402 0.1737 0.1322
 55 - 64 -0.0350 0.1754 -0.2693 0.1777 0.1118 0.1471 0.3276 0.1376
 65 + 0.1236 0.1778 -0.2963 0.1812 -0.3321 0.1542 0.1903 0.1422
Female -0.0103 0.0569 -0.0003 0.0598 0.0122 0.0523 0.0795 0.0505
Married -0.0395 0.0637 0.0870 0.0663 0.1626 0.0566 0.2080 0.0550
Taxable Equity Taxable Equity Tax-Deferred Tax-Deferred
Table 6:  Probit Estimates for Financial Asset Ownership, 1995
(Directly Held) (Mutual Funds) Equity BondsParameter Coeff. Std Error Coeff. Std Error Coeff. Std Error Coeff. Std Error
Constant -3.5558 0.4709 -2.5103 0.3436 1.4014 0.4697 -0.7415 0.3084
MTR 0.8311 0.2629 0.0894 0.2253 0.6534 0.5050 0.1673 0.2246
Income
 15 - 25 -0.2267 0.1701 0.3300 0.0993 0.5557 0.0970 0.0427 0.0791
 25 - 50 0.1269 0.1423 0.6067 0.0936 1.0198 0.1194 0.1738 0.0776
 50 - 75 0.4507 0.1540 0.6477 0.1101 1.2520 0.2185 0.1198 0.0976
 75 - 100 0.2345 0.1710 0.7162 0.1269 1.0093 0.3013 0.0657 0.1162
 100 - 250 0.4280 0.1630 0.6140 0.1238 1.1886 0.3447 0.0818 0.1143
 250 + 0.7312 0.1757 0.6925 0.1366 0.6474 0.4823 0.2270 0.1329
Net Worth
 50 - 100 0.3202 0.1553 0.3769 0.0775 0.5002 0.1196 0.3396 0.0702
 100 - 250 0.6628 0.1348 0.5897 0.0760 0.9932 0.1586 0.5295 0.0690
 250 - 1000 1.1019 0.1333 0.7602 0.0831 1.0104 0.2053 0.7256 0.0780
 1000 + 1.4560 0.1442 0.8404 0.1000 0.9944 0.3827 0.8997 0.0982
Education
 High Schl 0.4524 0.1508 0.2983 0.0860 0.3164 0.0903 0.3394 0.0734
 Some Col 0.6489 0.1501 0.3675 0.0899 0.5044 0.1017 0.3983 0.0776
 Col Deg 0.7178 0.1498 0.4427 0.0937 1.0693 0.1729 0.4165 0.0845
 Post Col 0.8249 0.1511 0.5438 0.0980 0.9048 0.2282 0.3932 0.0900
Age
 25 - 34 0.0328 0.3452 0.0750 0.1358 -0.0208 0.1268 0.0689 0.1102
 35 - 44 -0.0255 0.3382 0.0599 0.1353 -0.0009 0.1298 -0.0205 0.1098
 45 - 54 -0.0546 0.3382 -0.1899 0.1391 -0.1136 0.1445 0.1156 0.1128
 55 - 64 0.0593 0.3392 -0.3062 0.1440 0.3461 0.1674 0.1991 0.1191
 65 + 0.3843 0.3385 -0.0721 0.1472 0.9345 0.1718 0.2923 0.1238
Female -0.0248 0.0684 -0.0108 0.0511 0.0871 0.0856 -0.0703 0.0482
Married -0.1432 0.0790 0.2744 0.0556 -0.0006 0.0913 0.0060 0.0525
Tax-Exempt Taxable Interest Bearing Other Financial
Table 6:  Probit Estimates for Financial Asset Ownership, 1995, Continued
Bonds Bonds Accounts AssetsParameter Coeff. Std Error Coeff. Std Error Coeff. Std Error Coeff. Std Error
Constant -2.1486 0.1174 -3.3175 0.1608 -2.3522 0.1124 -2.0053 0.1032
MTR 0.3371 0.1418 1.0394 0.1667 0.8172 0.1378 1.0033 0.1320
Income
 15 - 25 0.3481 0.0597 0.2494 0.0880 0.3910 0.0615 0.3888 0.0527
 25 - 50 0.5281 0.0582 0.3707 0.0830 0.6601 0.0585 0.6110 0.0514
 50 - 75 0.6513 0.0686 0.3067 0.0933 0.7864 0.0684 0.6448 0.0620
 75 - 100 0.7662 0.0787 0.3972 0.1014 0.7508 0.0788 0.6629 0.0731
 100 - 250 0.8727 0.0781 0.3535 0.0998 0.8721 0.0798 0.6622 0.0737
 250 + 1.0933 0.0867 0.3521 0.1065 0.8664 0.0875 0.5204 0.0814
Net Worth
 50 - 100 0.2708 0.0488 0.3422 0.0697 0.2588 0.0427 0.3119 0.0404
 100 - 250 0.5826 0.0442 0.5570 0.0640 0.3978 0.0411 0.4863 0.0387
 250 - 1000 0.9258 0.0487 0.9958 0.0659 0.4440 0.0472 0.5935 0.0445
 1000 + 1.3257 0.0607 1.0926 0.0764 0.3157 0.0599 0.4717 0.0572
Education
 High Schl 0.3441 0.0496 0.2686 0.0707 0.1961 0.0465 0.2733 0.0412
 Some Col 0.4794 0.0524 0.3584 0.0727 0.2898 0.0490 0.2837 0.0444
 Col Deg 0.6910 0.0546 0.5359 0.0733 0.4381 0.0517 0.3182 0.0482
 Post Col 0.6454 0.0561 0.6348 0.0743 0.4328 0.0532 0.3804 0.0498
Age
 25 - 34 -0.0323 0.0846 -0.0933 0.1232 0.2977 0.0792 0.1938 0.0734
 35 - 44 -0.1153 0.0849 -0.0396 0.1210 0.2878 0.0795 0.2645 0.0734
 45 - 54 -0.1038 0.0857 -0.0996 0.1219 0.2977 0.0809 0.2945 0.0746
 55 - 64 -0.0257 0.0875 0.0037 0.1232 0.3223 0.0832 0.3994 0.0767
 65 + 0.1282 0.0905 0.0142 0.1254 -0.1344 0.0885 0.1152 0.0805
Female -0.0202 0.0314 0.0560 0.0371 0.0323 0.0298 0.0642 0.0286
Married -0.0739 0.0344 0.0606 0.0410 0.1280 0.0319 0.1866 0.0304
Year 1989 -0.0369 0.0459 0.3506 0.0648 0.1756 0.0463 0.2186 0.0414
Year 1992 -0.1403 0.0370 0.5359 0.0502 0.2669 0.0356 0.1208 0.0330
Year 1995 -0.1992 0.0358 0.7417 0.0477 0.4375 0.0339 0.0589 0.0321
Taxable Equity Taxable Equity Tax-Deferred Tax-Deferred
Table 7:  Probit Estimates for Financial Asset Ownership, Pooled Sample
(Directly Held) (Mutual Funds) Equity BondsParameter Coeff. Std Error Coeff. Std Error Coeff. Std Error Coeff. Std Error
Constant -3.2979 0.2028 -1.8348 0.0973 0.2921 0.1402 -1.0424 0.0862
MTR 1.1312 0.1667 0.4159 0.1314 1.1809 0.2695 0.1523 0.1304
Income
 15 - 25 0.1152 0.1020 0.2712 0.0495 0.4915 0.0509 0.1183 0.0407
 25 - 50 0.3683 0.0900 0.5403 0.0486 0.8338 0.0648 0.2450 0.0416
 50 - 75 0.5432 0.1003 0.6008 0.0595 1.0421 0.1162 0.2624 0.0536
 75 - 100 0.5881 0.1070 0.6541 0.0704 0.6692 0.1735 0.1613 0.0660
 100 - 250 0.7406 0.1056 0.5663 0.0703 0.6813 0.1901 0.1828 0.0664
 250 + 1.0356 0.1118 0.6660 0.0778 0.3905 0.3064 0.3243 0.0766
Net Worth
 50 - 100 0.3955 0.0891 0.3710 0.0406 0.5827 0.0615 0.3837 0.0363
 100 - 250 0.5672 0.0787 0.5638 0.0391 0.9269 0.0771 0.5517 0.0355
 250 - 1000 0.9898 0.0781 0.7054 0.0445 0.9096 0.1135 0.7122 0.0420
 1000 + 1.3945 0.0851 0.7267 0.0563 1.1655 0.2605 0.9612 0.0565
Education
 High Schl 0.2872 0.0769 0.3267 0.0409 0.4754 0.0447 0.1936 0.0350
 Some Col 0.4226 0.0780 0.4193 0.0441 0.7023 0.0572 0.2790 0.0388
 Col Deg 0.5552 0.0768 0.4793 0.0474 1.0530 0.0947 0.2906 0.0433
 Post Col 0.6208 0.0772 0.5188 0.0493 1.1044 0.1258 0.2395 0.0458
Age
 25 - 34 -0.1604 0.1810 0.0096 0.0675 -0.0895 0.0677 0.0069 0.0579
 35 - 44 -0.2071 0.1788 -0.0866 0.0680 -0.1177 0.0707 0.0222 0.0583
 45 - 54 -0.2257 0.1788 -0.2486 0.0698 -0.0803 0.0776 0.0737 0.0599
 55 - 64 0.0282 0.1789 -0.2498 0.0716 0.3032 0.0855 0.1393 0.0621
 65 + 0.2722 0.1797 -0.1348 0.0745 0.8937 0.0907 0.2071 0.0651
Female 0.0338 0.0402 0.0057 0.0279 -0.0421 0.0451 -0.0418 0.0264
Married -0.1323 0.0443 0.1516 0.0300 0.0694 0.0473 0.0908 0.0280
Year 1989 0.3230 0.0621 0.0426 0.0419 -0.1033 0.0578 0.3342 0.0384
Year 1992 0.3391 0.0497 0.0699 0.0331 -0.0340 0.0503 0.2412 0.0309
Year 1995 0.3147 0.0481 0.0380 0.0319 -0.0855 0.0495 0.1593 0.0301
Tax-Exempt Taxable Interest Bearing Other Financial
Table 7:  Probit Estimates for Financial Asset Ownership, Pooled Sample, Continued
Bonds Bonds Accounts AssetsPooled 1995 1992 1989 1983
Directly Held Equity 0.1246
* 0.0130 0.2455 0.1414 0.1263




























Other Financial Assets 0.0526 0.0575 0.0689 0.0688 0.1480
Pooled 1995 1992 1989 1983
Directly Held Equity 7.0% 0.8% 13.5% 7.9% 6.6%
Equity Mutual Funds 57.2% 37.5% 41.5% 111.2% 3.6%
Tax-Deferred Equity 12.7% 7.2% 7.5% 24.3% 19.1%
Tax-Deferred Bonds 12.5% 8.4% 9.0% 6.8% 21.8%
Tax-Exempt Bonds 76.3% 49.7% 62.5% 99.7% 70.1%
Taxable Bonds 5.9% 1.3% 10.2% 4.1% 10.6%
Interest Bearing Accounts 3.6% 2.0% 3.8% 3.7% 6.4%
Other Financial Assets 1.2% 1.3% 1.5% 1.4% 4.1%
Notes:
 1) Marginal tax rates and ownership probabilities are measured on a scale of 0 - 1.
 2) The top panel is the marginal effect of a unit increase in the marginal tax rate on the expected 
     probability of ownership.
 3) The bottom panel divides 10 percent of the estimate in the top panel by the corresponding 
     ownership probabilities reported in Table 1.
 4) Asterisks indicate statistical significance of the corresponding coefficient at the 5 percent level.
Table 8: Probit Marginal Effects for MTR, by Year
Effect of a 10 Percentage Point MTR Increase on Ownership
(Percent of Baseline Ownership Probabilities)Directly Equity Tax Tax Tax Interest Other
Held Mutual Deferred Deferred Exempt Taxable Bearing Financial
Equity Funds Equity Bonds Bonds Bonds Accounts Assets
Directly Held Equity
Equity Mutual Funds 0.2825
Tax-Deferred Equity 0.2064 0.2136
Tax-Deferred Bonds 0.0832 0.0261 0.2964
Tax-Exempt Bonds 0.3250 0.3966 0.1599 0.0928
Taxable Bonds 0.2604 0.4355 0.1134 0.1054 0.3484
Interest Bearing Accounts 0.3263 0.3648 0.2077 0.1476 0.3589 0.2780
Other Financial Assets 0.1205 0.0938 0.0829 0.0699 0.0935 0.1426 0.2164
Note: The entry for each cell is the estimated correlation parameter from a bivariate probit estimated on  the assets listed in the
         corresponding row and column of the table.
Table 9: Estimated Correlation Matrices from Bivariate Probits, Pooled SampleParameter Coeff. Std Error Coeff. Std Error Coeff. Std Error Coeff. Std Error
Constant -0.5681 0.1132 -0.5688 0.1299 -0.4481 0.1082 -0.4737 0.1408
MTR -0.0786 0.0790 0.2897 0.0795 0.1265 0.0769 0.1125 0.0850
Income
 15 - 25 0.0811 0.0335 0.0154 0.0384 0.1110 0.0307 0.1179 0.0346
 25 - 50 0.1496 0.0324 0.0651 0.0361 0.1883 0.0291 0.1752 0.0328
 50 - 75 0.1638 0.0397 0.0556 0.0428 0.2459 0.0366 0.1432 0.0400
 75 - 100 0.2139 0.0443 0.0460 0.0476 0.3021 0.0417 0.1047 0.0445
 100 - 250 0.2086 0.0438 0.0386 0.0460 0.2623 0.0407 0.1395 0.0446
 250 + 0.3243 0.0475 0.0077 0.0494 0.2120 0.0448 0.0011 0.0476
Net Worth
 50 - 100 0.0510 0.0309 0.0788 0.0345 0.0520 0.0279 0.1128 0.0287
 100 - 250 0.1418 0.0282 0.1303 0.0320 0.0268 0.0272 0.1068 0.0267
 250 - 1000 0.2174 0.0301 0.2454 0.0312 -0.0042 0.0294 0.0777 0.0294
 1000 + 0.3947 0.0351 0.2573 0.0358 -0.0866 0.0346 0.0080 0.0355
Education
 High Schl 0.0536 0.0314 0.0365 0.0325 0.0432 0.0268 0.0495 0.0305
 Some Col 0.0797 0.0330 0.0672 0.0331 0.0807 0.0273 0.0349 0.0316
 Col Deg 0.1166 0.0341 0.1231 0.0345 0.1225 0.0291 0.0385 0.0345
 Post Col 0.1221 0.0344 0.1563 0.0349 0.1213 0.0300 0.0465 0.0357
Age
 25 - 34 0.0305 0.0445 -0.0658 0.0514 0.1422 0.0398 0.0425 0.0427
 35 - 44 -0.0309 0.0427 -0.0542 0.0510 0.1498 0.0404 0.1095 0.0415
 45 - 54 -0.0381 0.0434 -0.0564 0.0520 0.1275 0.0407 0.0826 0.0418
 55 - 64 -0.0234 0.0452 -0.0413 0.0530 0.0805 0.0426 0.1437 0.0443
 65 + 0.0395 0.0451 -0.0583 0.0533 -0.0614 0.0445 0.0864 0.0451
Female -0.0075 0.0184 0.0046 0.0190 -0.0005 0.0174 0.0220 0.0179
Married -0.0598 0.0212 0.0168 0.0215 0.0346 0.0194 0.0607 0.0204
s 0.3633 0.0082 0.3254 0.0113 0.4019 0.0075 0.4163 0.0090
Taxable Equity Taxable Equity Tax-Deferred Tax-Deferred
(Directly Held) (Mutual Funds) Equity Bonds
Table 10:  Tobit Estimates of Financial Asset Shares, 1995
Adding Up Constraints Imposed on Marginal EffectsParameter Coeff. Std Error Coeff. Std Error Coeff. Std Error Coeff. Std Error
Constant -0.8438 0.0918 -0.4782 0.0688 1.2831 0.1311 0.0218 0.1060
MTR 0.2253 0.0762 -0.0097 0.0478 -0.1402 0.0699 -0.1044 0.0711
Income
 15 - 25 -0.0586 0.0406 0.0597 0.0255 -0.1499 0.0372 -0.0369 0.0353
 25 - 50 0.0074 0.0397 0.0889 0.0228 -0.2956 0.0343 -0.0353 0.0335
 50 - 75 0.0709 0.0449 0.0999 0.0262 -0.3056 0.0383 -0.0726 0.0383
 75 - 100 0.0268 0.0501 0.1012 0.0279 -0.2901 0.0414 -0.1204 0.0416
 100 - 250 0.0728 0.0472 0.0767 0.0274 -0.2741 0.0418 -0.1295 0.0400
 250 + 0.1562 0.0502 0.1197 0.0296 -0.2687 0.0458 -0.1058 0.0432
Net Worth
 50 - 100 0.0456 0.0423 0.0468 0.0181 -0.2271 0.0282 0.0841 0.0296
 100 - 250 0.1145 0.0353 0.0817 0.0177 -0.2945 0.0267 0.0869 0.0280
 250 - 1000 0.2324 0.0367 0.1072 0.0187 -0.3541 0.0278 0.0779 0.0288
 1000 + 0.3321 0.0392 0.1273 0.0206 -0.4102 0.0330 0.1184 0.0336
Education
 High Schl 0.0585 0.0379 0.0495 0.0210 -0.1805 0.0335 0.0813 0.0321
 Some Col 0.0981 0.0382 0.0696 0.0222 -0.2277 0.0337 0.0769 0.0324
 Col Deg 0.1071 0.0395 0.0731 0.0221 -0.2610 0.0342 0.0428 0.0329
 Post Col 0.1274 0.0405 0.0964 0.0235 -0.2741 0.0344 0.0212 0.0332
Age
 25 - 34 -0.0064 0.0567 -0.0153 0.0371 -0.1007 0.0539 0.0123 0.0532
 35 - 44 -0.0355 0.0542 -0.0210 0.0366 -0.0693 0.0540 -0.0391 0.0525
 45 - 54 -0.0491 0.0546 -0.0663 0.0371 -0.0493 0.0547 0.0054 0.0536
 55 - 64 -0.0155 0.0557 -0.0919 0.0375 -0.0661 0.0554 0.0121 0.0547
 65 + 0.0666 0.0554 -0.0173 0.0382 -0.0524 0.0564 0.0429 0.0565
Female -0.0079 0.0197 0.0016 0.0117 0.0136 0.0170 -0.0288 0.0179
Married -0.0435 0.0229 0.0433 0.0137 -0.0181 0.0192 -0.0299 0.0198
s 0.2996 0.0118 0.2552 0.0090 0.4019 0.0052 0.4381 0.0082
Tax-Exempt Taxable Interest Bearing Other Financial
Bonds Bonds Accounts Assets
Table 10:  Tobit Estimates of Financial Asset Shares, 1995, Continued
Adding Up Constraints Imposed on Marginal EffectsDirectly Equity Tax Tax Tax Interest Other
Held Mutual Deferred Deferred Exempt Taxable Bearing Financial
Parameter Equity Funds Equity Bonds Bonds Bonds Accounts Assets
Uncond.
















































































































 25 - 34 0.0085 -0.0112 0.0536
* 0.0150 -0.0010 -0.0046 -0.0665 0.0062
 35 - 44 -0.0086 -0.0093 0.0564
* 0.0385
* -0.0053 -0.0063 -0.0458 -0.0197
 45 - 54 -0.0106 -0.0096 0.0481
* 0.0291
* -0.0073 -0.0198 -0.0326 0.0027
 55 - 64 -0.0065 -0.0070 0.0303 0.0506
* -0.0023 -0.0274
* -0.0437 0.0061
 65 + 0.0110 -0.0100 -0.0232 0.0304 0.0099 -0.0052 -0.0346 0.0216
Female -0.0021 0.0008 -0.0002 0.0077 -0.0012 0.0005 0.0090 -0.0145
Married -0.0167




 1) Marginal tax rates and portfolio shares are measured on a scale of 0 - 1.
 2) The first row is the unconditional average share as reported in Table 3.
 3) Each cell is the marginal effect of a unit increase in the marginal tax rate on the expected portfolio share.
 4) Asterisks indicate statistical significance of the corresponding coefficient at the 5 percent level.
Table 11:  Marginal Effects from Tobits, 1995Parameter Coeff. Std Error Coeff. Std Error Coeff. Std Error Coeff. Std Error
Constant -0.7967 0.0458 -0.3438 0.0248 1.3234 0.0374 -0.0573 0.0352
MTR 0.2836 0.0513 0.0111 0.0305 -0.2117 0.0420 -0.1089 0.0423
Income
 15 - 25 0.0128 0.0255 0.0566 0.0132 -0.1638 0.0196 -0.0071 0.0183
 25 - 50 0.0532 0.0244 0.1007 0.0125 -0.2807 0.0187 0.0008 0.0179
 50 - 75 0.0900 0.0293 0.1160 0.0149 -0.3157 0.0214 -0.0286 0.0210
 75 - 100 0.1205 0.0321 0.1233 0.0168 -0.3091 0.0236 -0.0784 0.0234
 100 - 250 0.1611 0.0309 0.0971 0.0166 -0.3094 0.0241 -0.0894 0.0235
 250 + 0.2447 0.0326 0.1478 0.0180 -0.3374 0.0258 -0.0679 0.0251
Net Worth
 50 - 100 0.0531 0.0247 0.0494 0.0101 -0.1898 0.0154 0.0948 0.0156
 100 - 250 0.0902 0.0216 0.0739 0.0094 -0.2578 0.0142 0.0856 0.0146
 250 - 1000 0.2141 0.0219 0.0919 0.0103 -0.3124 0.0154 0.0597 0.0156
 1000 + 0.3382 0.0245 0.1002 0.0122 -0.3700 0.0185 0.1294 0.0190
Education
 High Schl 0.0405 0.0208 0.0601 0.0105 -0.1457 0.0160 0.0349 0.0153
 Some Col 0.0689 0.0220 0.0842 0.0114 -0.1941 0.0168 0.0441 0.0161
 Col Deg 0.0913 0.0217 0.0798 0.0117 -0.2219 0.0172 0.0141 0.0167
 Post Col 0.1070 0.0221 0.0897 0.0122 -0.2168 0.0172 -0.0188 0.0167
Age
 25 - 34 -0.0484 0.0375 -0.0313 0.0197 -0.0509 0.0291 0.0038 0.0276
 35 - 44 -0.0639 0.0368 -0.0524 0.0195 -0.0619 0.0290 0.0050 0.0276
 45 - 54 -0.0802 0.0367 -0.0854 0.0198 -0.0582 0.0293 0.0044 0.0280
 55 - 64 -0.0162 0.0368 -0.0772 0.0201 -0.0881 0.0296 -0.0046 0.0284
 65 + 0.0598 0.0370 -0.0332 0.0206 -0.0555 0.0303 0.0115 0.0291
Female 0.0032 0.0123 0.0047 0.0067 0.0046 0.0098 -0.0149 0.0101
Married -0.0468 0.0135 0.0115 0.0074 -0.0287 0.0108 0.0160 0.0109
Year 1989 0.0779 0.0182 0.0098 0.0101 -0.1014 0.0149 0.0369 0.0147
Year 1992 0.0933 0.0147 0.0150 0.0079 -0.1125 0.0118 0.0277 0.0117
Year 1995 0.0703 0.0139 0.0116 0.0075 -0.1436 0.0112 0.0245 0.0115









Table 12: Tobit Estimates of Financial Asset Shares, Pooled Sample, Continued
Adding Up Constraints Imposed on Marginal EffectsDirectly Equity Tax Tax Tax Interest Other
Held Mutual Deferred Deferred Exempt Taxable Bearing Financial
Parameter Equity Funds Equity Bonds Bonds Bonds Accounts Assets
Uncond.




































































































































 25 - 34 -0.0065 -0.0030 0.0314
* 0.0230
* -0.0061 -0.0087 -0.0318 0.0018

















 65 + 0.0106 0.0018 -0.0038 0.0224
* 0.0075 -0.0093 -0.0347 0.0055
Female -0.0056
































 1) Marginal tax rates and portfolio shares are measured on a scale of 0 - 1.
 2) The first row is the unconditional average share as reported in Table 3.
 3) Each cell is the marginal effect of a unit increase in the marginal tax rate on the expected portfolio share.
 4) Asterisks indicate statistical significance of the corresponding coefficient at the 5 percent level.
Table 13:  Marginal Effects from Tobits, Pooled SampleDirectly Equity Tax Tax Tax Interest Other
Held Mutual Deferred Deferred Exempt Taxable Bearing Financial
Equity Funds Equity Bonds Bonds Bonds Accounts Assets
Directly Held Equity
Equity Mutual Funds 0.0825
Tax-Deferred Equity 0.0207 0.0740
Tax-Deferred Bonds -0.0898 -0.0877 0.0481
Tax-Exempt Bonds 0.0481 0.2114 0.0091 -0.0494
Taxable Bonds 0.0493 0.2597 -0.0305 -0.0362 0.1568
Interest Bearing Accounts -0.3527 -0.2435 -0.4175 -0.4032 -0.2879 -0.3108
Other Financial Assets -0.0900 -0.0707 -0.1069 -0.1101 -0.0906 -0.0458 -0.5734
Note: The entry for each cell is the value of the correlation parameter that maximizes the likelihood function for a bivariate
          tobit for the assets listed in the corresponding row and column of the table when the coefficients are fixed at their
          values in Table 12.
Table 14: Estimated Correlation Matrices from Bivariate Tobits, Pooled SamplePooled 1995 1992 1989 1983
Directly Held Equity 0.0065 -0.0219 0.0192 0.0048 -0.0151

















Taxable Bonds 0.0031 -0.0029 0.0279 -0.0148 0.0020
Interest Bearing Accounts -0.1325
* -0.0926
* -0.0631 -0.0926 -0.1835
*




Pooled 1995 1992 1989 1983
Directly Held Equity 1.5% -5.3% 4.4% 1.1% -3.1%
Equity Mutual Funds 17.8% 17.2% 11.9% 42.1% -4.0%
Tax-Deferred Equity 5.3% 4.1% 5.2% 8.8% 11.2%
Tax-Deferred Bonds 7.3% 3.7% 6.6% 0.5% 13.7%
Tax-Exempt Bonds 27.7% 28.1% 24.4% 41.2% 13.8%
Taxable Bonds 0.8% -0.8% 7.2% -3.8% 0.6%
Interest Bearing Accounts -2.4% -1.9% -1.2% -1.6% -2.9%
Other Financial Assets -3.4% -3.3% -10.4% -3.3% 1.1%
Notes:
 1) Marginal tax rates and portfolio shares are measured on a scale of 0 - 1.
 2) The top panel is the marginal effect of a unit increase in the marginal tax rate on the expected 
     portfolio share.
 3) The bottom panel divides 10 percent of the estimate in the top panel by the corresponding 
     unconditional average portfolio shares reported in Table 2.
 4) Asterisks indicate statistical significance of the corresponding coefficient at the 5 percent level.
Table 15: Tobit Marginal Effects for MTR, by Year
Effect of a 10 Percentage Point MTR Increase on Portfolio Share
(Percent of Baseline Unconditional Average Share)